As is well known, the amount of aid given by international donors both to Israel and to the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt) is unparalleled in the world, but the fact that people can turn violent against their own CSOs trying to promote reconciliation speaks abundantly about the resentment that external aid can generate. Studying the nexus EU-civil society-Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot therefore be done without a general overview of the particular setting in which aid for conflict transformation takes place. This report is articulated in four parts. The paper first briefly discusses the nature of the conflict and recent trends in its development, affecting, inter alia, the domestic context in which civil society operates. It then looks at the EU's involvement in the conflict and presents the tools that the EU uses in its support for civil society. Moving on, it analyses the impact and effectiveness of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies (with a view on CSO typologies and activities) and suggests why the effectiveness of civil society has remained limited. Finally the paper deals with the EU's impact and the role of EU-funded programmes supporting civil society involvement in conflict transformation, testing the different hypotheses outlined in the guiding report issued for this work package.
Introduction
Yesh Gvul ("There is a limit") is an Israeli peace group campaigning against the occupation by backing soldiers who refuse duties of a repressive or aggressive nature. 3 In a 4 June 2009 collective email, Yesh Gvul invited its supporters to join a demonstration in Tel Aviv two days later. The announced purpose of the demonstration was to 'strengthen Israeli voices that are fed up with the government's policies'. Not a protest against a new law passed by the Israeli government, not a generic call to end occupation, not a call to stop Israeli government harassing anti-militarist activists, but a cry of despair and an expression of alienation in the face of the general trends of government policies. This invitation by people 'fed up by with the government's policies' should hint at a sort of moral fatigue by Israeli peace activists and the difficult struggle that some small groups try to organize in the view of transforming and confronting the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Yet, renewed forms of civil society activism might be coming more from the Israeli side than from the Palestinian side, this paper will argue.
In April 2009, two acts of violence were committed by masked Palestinians against two cultural centres in the West Bank town of Jenin. One of the targets was Kamandjati a cultural NGO founded in 2002, teaching classical music to local children and running a youth orchestra. The other was the Freedom Theatre whose entrance was set on fire. No one was hurt in these two incidents, yet, they show a profound malaise in Palestinian society. The motives for these attacks were unclear, but it seems that the attack against the Theatre was a response to the too caustic criticism of Orwell's classic Animal Farm which, in the Jenin's re-interpretation, criticized the local political elites for corruption and treason against its own people. Some saw behind the attack against the cultural centre an Islamist hand unhappy with the gender promiscuity that such cultural associations can harbour, while others thought of it as a retaliation for having accepted to play in Tel Aviv in one of the joint activities that many international donors like to fund on their agenda of "peace and conflict-transformation" (Giorgio, 2009: 20) .
These two vignettes illustrate the predicament of civil society organizations (CSO) active in conflict transformation, and working often against difficult odds. The second example also illustrates the power of foreign aid and its mixed blessing. As is well known, the amount of aid given by international donors both to Israel and to the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt) is unparalleled in the world, but the fact that people can turn violent against their own CSOs trying to promote reconciliation speaks abundantly about the resentment that external aid can generate. Studying the nexus EU-civil society-Palestinian-Israeli conflict cannot therefore be done without a general overview of the particular setting in which aid for conflict transformation takes place. A senior analyst of the impact of aid, Mary Anderson noted, during a visit to the oPt in May 2004 that 'everyone with whom [she] spoke, without exception (international, Palestinian, Israeli), agreed that donor assistance to the oPt plays into and reinforces the Israeli occupation of Palestine. People noted that aid "relieves Israel of its obligations as an occupier", that it "rebuilds whatever Israel destroys" and "enables" the continuation of such actions, that currently it simply "maintains" levels of poverty resulting from a strict closure regime and other aspects of Israeli control by providing major financial resources for food, employment, etc.' (Anderson 2004: 5) .
Since the EU has started supporting explicitly civil society in the field of conflict transformation only recently (if we take two programmes conferring a clear mandate for the EU in this domain, one can notice that the Partnership for Peace Programme and the European Neighbourhood Policy in
Israel and the oPt (see below for more details) were adopted respectively in 2000 and 2005) , one can wonder whether this engagement on the European side is not a latecomer. The first generation of conflict transformation activities through civil society (with the so-called normalization programmes, or people-to-people activities) emerged very quickly in the first years of the Oslo peace process (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and international donors featuring prominently in that field at that time were the USA and the Norwegian government, not the EU.
The EU might now be the single largest donor in the oPt, but it is well known that politically it is only second to the US in terms of influence on the peace process. Tocci speaks also about 'the widening gap between rhetoric and reality in EU policy' in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Tocci 2005) and stresses the ambiguities in some of EU's decisions, in particular with regard to the last round of military operation against Gaza (Dec. 2008 .-Jan. 2009 ) (Tocci 2009 ). It is important here to stress that the local population is very conscious of the erratic attitude and programmes promoted by certain donors. A survey conducted in 1997 revealed that about 40 per cent of the population believed that 'foreign funding had a […] negative or very negative' effect in the Territories (Kassis 2001: 44) , a trend that could explain why people can turn violent against certain associations perceived as too subservient to foreign donors' policies, as in the case of Jenin's cultural centre mentioned above.
As I have argued elsewhere (Challand 2009 (Challand , 2008a ) one cannot and should not dissociate the impact of local civil societies (at least in the Palestinian case, but arguably also in part in the Israeli case) from the overall influence of international aid. Aid (in general and the one earmarked for civil society in particular) has contributed to a profound transformation of the social and political fabric of local societies. This trend, in part set in motion from the mid-1980s, was accelerated with the professionalization of aid (at the expenses of small-scale solidarity funding which still favoured voluntary work) and the gradual governmentalization of aid, introducing technical criteria (at the expenses of political support). One important result of the transformation ushered in by the politicization and institutionalization of aid has been the political disaffection of the leftist factions in Palestine (and in the light of the 2009 Israeli election one might wonder whether this is also true for Israel) and even contributed to the victory of the Islamist camp in -2006 (Challand 2008a . 4 Nabulsi even argued that one consequence of aid in favour of the peace process 'was both to interfere with and to undermine democratic processes in already existing structures of associational networks. By entirely neglecting local party, grassroots and union platforms and committees, donors contributed to a de-democratization of civil society in the West Bank and Gaza instead of increasing the capacity of civil society for democratization ' (Nabulsi 2005: 123) . In order to understand what can be the impact of the EU's projects for CSOs active in conflict transformation, one therefore needs to know certain facts about the context of aid, its historical evolution and that of
CSOs.
This report is articulated in four parts. The paper first briefly discusses the nature of the conflict and recent trends in its development, affecting, inter alia, the domestic context in which civil society operates. It then looks at the EU's involvement in the conflict and presents the tools that the EU uses in its support for civil society. Moving on, it analyses the impact and effectiveness of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies (with a view on CSO typologies and activities) and suggests why the effectiveness of civil society has remained limited. Finally the paper deals with the EU's impact and the role of EU-funded programmes supporting civil society involvement in conflict transformation, testing the different hypotheses outlined in the guiding report issued for this work package (Tocci 2008) . One final note on terminology. When we refer to CSOs we follow the loose definition given by Tocci (2008: 9) . At times we will use NGOs and this term should not be interchanged with CSOs, since the former refers to professionalized organizations, while CSOs also include smaller and less formally structured organizations such as charitable organizations, zakat committees or youth clubs.
Dynamics and representations of the conflict
Much has been written and said about the origins and evolutions of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
As any conflict in the world, both sides have generated contrasting narratives, myths and histories about a conflict that started nearly one hundred years ago. As anthropologists have shown, conflicts are always about power and/or resources but only then express themselves or find a justification in terms of identities (Cohen 1974) . This is not the proper place to chart again the course of this conflict. So we will limit ourselves to a conceptual description of a conflict that had arisen for a small yet symbolically charged piece of land.
To qualify the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in one phrase, one could say that although it is often confused and thought as a conflict between two roughly equal or even entities, the conflict is the result of an 'extreme asymmetry of power and resources' through which Israel is able to maintain and feed the vulnerability of the quasi-Palestinian state (Khan 2004: 43, 49f Asymmetric containment is also clearly perceptible in terms of economic and developmental indicators. Israel has created a captive marked in the oPt (hinting at a form of colonial practice) and the economic viability of a rent-seeking PNA depends on the transfer of its VAT revenues by Israel (and Israel has in many moments of the conflicts used this, among others, as a pressuring tool on the PNA by withholding the VAT refunding), not to mention the essential financial manna of international donors' aid, in which the EU has come to play a leading role in the last ten years in becoming the main financial supporter of the PNA (Le More 2008). The emerging Palestinian state is one best characterized as neo-patrimonial in practice (Brynen 1995) , in which good working connections between the Israeli military/intelligence milieus are paramount to economic success in the oPt (Lagerquist 2003) . 'Palestinian economic vulnerability ensured that control over critical Palestinian rents gave Israel greater leverage to ensure compliance in security and other issues' (Khan 2004: 50) . The tragic economic situation of the Gaza Strip is mostly the consequences of the four decades of Israel's de-development policies (Roy 2001) amplified with the harsh closure during most of the second Intifada, but also the result of the uneven access to economic rents on the 7 On the reasons why the PLO leadership accepted the Oslo logic 'to revive its flagging political fortunes', see Sayigh (1997a: 615) . 8 Such interpretation would reinforce Legrain's interpretation that since the mid-1990s, Israel has worked on rendering the non-existence of a Palestinian state a permanent feature (Legrain 2009 [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] , it is in large part based on the assumption that through peer-to-peer contact and exchange -namely that favouring joint activities -a sense of normalization would emerge amongst the two peoples and favour reconciliation (PIJ 2005). As we will see later, this type of activity was rather quickly (from 1998 onwards) boycotted by most Palestinian CSOs precisely because they gave the false impression of a discussion amongst equals and thus hid the profound asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians.
The idea of equal footing is also the result of the battle for victimhood. Looking at the Israeli establishment's PR and of self-defence arguments, one can see that Israel insists on being presented as the (main) victim of terror, hatred and eternal anti-Semitism, negating thus the structural violence of occupation, the question of land confiscation, amongst other charges that are frequently levelled against Israel. Similarly (I succumb to the equal-footing trap I am describing), Palestinians tend to depict themselves as the only victims of occupation and of the nakba and fail to acknowledge that certain uses of violence are unjustifiable and overlook Jewish suffering provoked by the conflict.
Both lines of argument when put together (and it is a sort of passage obligé for political correctness to mention collective suffering on both sides) contribute therefore to the impression of an equal suffering and therefore equal footing between the two enemies.
Hanafi's analysis of the reports and statements published over the last five years by Human Rights Watch (HRW) is a case in point in the misleading equal footing representation (Hanafi 2009 Liebermann has shed a crude light on the level of racism existing inside Israel against the Arab minority, although the policies of Israel to prevent this minority to become full and equal citizens has been existing since its inception in 1948 (Cook 2006) . If conflict transformation is about bringing peace, democracy and lasting justice and equality, then it also ought to consider seriously the question of the Arab minority inside Israel. This report will suggest that there is some potential to be explored for CSOs in this regard, but often scholars and conflict specialists tend to exclude this minority out of the equation, or simply ignore basic facts about this part of the Israeli population (Payes 2003 being the notable exception). This paper will develop the issue of forced dualism throughout its analysis, highlighting how "queering strategies" have percolated into the strategies of some peace activists in response.
10 'Methodological nationalism assumes that humanity is naturally divided into a limited number of nations, which internally organized themselves as nation-states and externally set boundaries to distinguish themselves from other nation-states… Much of social science assumes the coincidence of social boundaries with state boundaries, believing that social action occurs primarily within and only secondarily across, these divisions…' (Beck 2003: 453-454 ).
Any sound conflict transformation strategy entails addressing the causes of the conflict and not just work on its symptoms. This seems to be popular wisdom for conflict specialists and all those familiar with the Palestinian situation: The frequently heard call to boycott aid in order not to subsidize the occupation (Anderson 2004 ) is a proof that donors and development actors know all too well that much of the money goes down the drain for the never-ending cure of symptoms that will continuously remerge, and that effectively eradicating the causes of the conflict would be the best solution. On the Israeli side, those working on addressing the causes of the conflict are becoming an increasingly small minority, while many work on alleviating the symptoms of violence. Thus, during the campaign against Gaza in January 2009, the Israeli media relayed almost uniquely the suffering of those exposed to Qassem rockets in Sderot and in southern cities of Israel.
The last Knesset election is another good example of the gradual shift inside Israeli society: in those elections, the parties that made significant progress in terms of seats are right-wing parties calling for unilateralism, when not outright dismissal of the peace agenda, and the evolution of the leftwing party Meretz illustrates the fate of the peace-camp which was strong in the 1992 and 1996 elections but which has since then seen the ground vanish under its feet. General trends seem therefore not to be moving towards the right direction.
The EU and Civil Society in Israel and Palestine
The EU's array of instruments in support of civil society described in Tocci (2008: 2-6) 
Civil society in Israel and Palestine

CSO Typologies
There is a peace industry (Bouillon 2004) in the oPt and many new CSOs were created in the last twenty years reflecting this pouring of money for advocacy purposes. Yet some of the Palestinian activism dates backs to the Ottoman empire (the oldest NGO still active was established in 1907) , and the core of Palestinian civil society, at least the more structured one, started in the 1970s with the popular committees as a reaction to the Israeli Civilian Administration's policies of dedevelopment. In that process, nationalist political parties which were banned under the occupation regime organized various popular committees orientated around certain themes, such as health, women, education, agriculture, etc (Hiltermann 1991 , Robinson 1992 . These committees were later consolidated into professional NGOs. In terms of CSOs active in advocacy (HR, democracy, conflict resolution), the database I gathered Through the data collected for this report, I wanted to check how much change took place in the advocacy sector during these years. Many new CSOs emerged on the scene. I therefore surveyed the organizations which are members of the Peres Center-led Palestinian Israeli NGO Forum (see below). Out of its 99 members, I searched the founding year for half of them. The result (Table 2) confirms that there is a great level of turnover in the formation of CSOs active in conflict transformation and that many peace organizations are only recent constructs. A final overview in terms of "historical depth" of CSOs comes from a brief analysis of the member organizations of Ittijah, the Union of Arab Community Based Associations, an umbrella organization lobbying for the advancement of Arab CSOs inside Israel and based in Haifa (Table   3) . 25 Here again, one can see that the Oslo years kick-started the creation of many CSOs but that many more organizations have been created during the years of the second Intifada. 
Total 63
Average foundation year (oldest 1976) 1996
The 16 interviews carried out for this report (9 Palestinian CSOs, 7 Israeli CSOs, and 2 with EU officials) took place between 2-8 May 2009 (See Annex I for an overview of these CSOs).
Interviews were done in English, with one interview in Arabic (UCS, Jerusalem). Most interviews were recorded after having obtained informed consent and thorough explanations about the purpose of the report and the limited use of these recordings. Fieldwork was originally planned for 8-21 Jan.
2009, but due to the military operations in Gaza and the volatile situation in the West Bank, it was postponed. Previous experience of interviews in the region in such tense moments proved that it was at best useless to do interviews (people do not really concentrate on your questions but comment on the ongoing operations) and at worst potentially ethically damaging to the wider scientific community since doing interviews on peace-building in such circumstances would be an insult to the civilian populations suffering from ongoing attacks.
CSO Activities
The activities of CSOs in Israel and Palestine are split in direct and indirect actions on the conflict.
The most obvious cases of direct action are (in some cases joint) activities confronting openly the question of the occupation and trying to force changes of public opinion on this crucial aspect of the conflict. Throughout the last three decades of peace activism, there have been different themes that have brought peace activists to demonstrate around the bridging activism of women against the occupation (from the "Women in Black" to "Black Laundry" and gays and lesbians activists), solidarity peace coexistence movements ("Neve Shalom -Wahat al Salam Village", "Ta'ayoush"), or recently activism against the wall/security fence ("Anarchists against the Wall").
More specific to Israel, one should list here the activities of various peacenik movements, calling for Israeli youth either not to serve at all in the Israeli Army (e.g. "New Outloook"), to refuse to serve in the violent context of the occupation (e.g."Yesh Gvul") (Dloomy 2005) , or to bring to the fore testimonies of reprehensible behaviour and action performed by soldiers in the oPt in order to expose the structural rather than ad hoc vices of the occupation (e.g. "Breaking the Silence"). There are also numerous organizations lobbying at transforming the conflict be it towards a peaceful and just resolution ("Peace Now", "Gush Shalom") or towards an even more securitized understanding of the conflict, leading to even more unilateralism on the Israeli side and possibly also fuelling the conflict (various think tanks and university institutes could be named here) (Brown et al. 2008 ). In Israel as well, both approaches are found. Many CSOs work through adversarial means through public mobilization to state the basic truth that the occupation is the mother of all troubles.
Professional human rights organizations, though careful in not entrapping themselves in predefined political positions on the conflict or on preferred negotiations strategies, 29 also work on monitoring the costs of the conflicts, but only few work publicly through the "naming and shaming" strategy. A recent initiative using such strategy has been launched by the "Coalition of Women for Peace" (a forum 'bringing together independent women and ten feminist peace organizations who work relentlessly for peace and justice' 30 created in 2000) who monitors the economic dimension of settlement expansion. 31 In this web-observatory (www.whoprofits.org), this activists' network provides the public in Israel and internationally with accurate information about business interests invested in maintaining and even fuelling the occupation. This is a typical example of the name and shame strategy which is at the very heart of monitoring corporate governance. Arguably, many of these dichotomies (direct/indirect bearing on the conflict, adversarial/nonadversarial, and causes/symptoms) are at best blurred. Indeed one could argue that an organization monitoring human rights violations both confronts the reality of the occupation (direct bearing) and tries to do awareness raising amongst the local population (indirect and non-adversarial approach).
Clearly this work is about discussing the symptoms of the conflict, but at the same time tries to address the very cause of the conflict by showing its negative effects.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, another dichotomy may more accurately capture the activities of CSOs, based on two opposing yet not mutually exclusive paradigms. On the one hand, the contact paradigm argues that conflict transformation can occur through exchanges or discussions between people. Through interaction, a feeling of trust is built onto which a gradual rapprochement between conflicting societies can take place. People-to-people actions are a prime embodiment of this approach. On the other hand, the cognitive paradigm is based on the idea that it is the gradual exchanges and possibly even recognition of conflicting ideas, narratives but also of emotions that makes reconciliation possible between conflicting societies. This cognitive dimension can also be part of the people-to-people activities, but what distinguishes it from the contact paradigm is that the cognitive dimension of exchanges allows transgressing fixed senses of (national) identities and in Israeli public debates, and which might limit the impact of CSO activism and particularly the challenge that CSOs can put forward about the cognitive dimension of the conflict. 
CSO Impact
On the basis of the interviews carried out for this report, it may look like all CSOs lead or at least try to contribute to peacebuilding. This is at least their more or less declared goal, although many human rights organizations prefer not to have an official position in terms of the outcome of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine in order not to jeopardize the impartiality in their work. One less covered dimension of civil society impact is that it might serve another purpose than that of peacebuilding (or contribute only indirectly to it): it seems that certain peace organizations are the preferred channel for political retribution (hence the fact that the dividends of people-to-people activities were reaped at least in the first years by key political actors). One can also wonder, with the notion of asymmetric containment in mind, whether the people-to-people, or business-tobusiness approach do not serve the purpose of establishing alternative channels of control and of cooptation. The situation of the two conflicting PNAs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip contributes to the activation of these alternative channels: rumours suggest that business channels between
Palestinians of Israel and the West Bank are fully operating with the blessing of Israel (and of the international community) precisely to demonstrate that the model of "economic exchanges" with the West Bank-PNA is giving fruits also to the Palestinian population (and indeed, the impression that one gets nowadays in the street of Ramallah is that of a buzzing economic life, a bit like in the years that preceded the outbreak of the second Intifada). 44 If this interpretation is correct, then it reinforces the idea that there is a true "peace business" (Bouillon 2004) or at least, that there is a stark overlap between military-intelligence milieus in Israel and economic elites in the oPt (Lagerquist 2003) , hinting therefore at the limits of effective independence of both Palestinian and
Israeli civil societies (and reinforcing the asymmetric containment characterization of the conflict).
Spotting CSOs speaking the "right" language that influential donors want to hear or working with multiplier NGOs which "teach" the "right" approach to smaller community-based organizations (Challand 2009: 186-9) shows, at least in theory, to increasing the civil society impact. Yet above all it illustrates the possibility and functioning of co-opting different (discursive) networks. It remains to be seen whether such measures are actually effective.
CSO impact is probably also limited in Israel because of the fact that Israel is a militarized society:
Ben Eliezer has also shown, historically, how the praetorianization of party politics has 'helped to blur the distinction between military and civil in a way that would bring about the militarization of society and spread the idea of a military solution to the national problem from the narrow confines of a military unit to the whole of society' (Ben Eliezer 1998: 62). It makes it therefore even more difficult for CSOs to air criticism of the securitization of the conflict (Dloomy 2005) , let alone to organize alternative social networks in which military/security people do not steer the course of civil society debates and activities in one way of the other.
CSO Effectiveness
44 President Shimon Peres is also a fervent advocate of the Erez model of economic development (and per extension of a Middle Eastern Free Trade Zone): industrial plants are built on the borders, manned with cheap Palestinian labour and selling products labelled as "Israeli" (in part with the EU turning a blind eye and granting preferential treatment to products originating in the oPt yet bearing Israeli certificates of origin). Russian female activists and other women associations in the Shass movement are all evidence that some of the civil society activism is genuinely grassroots. The impression that one has in the oPt is that this authentic grassroots spirit has been lost to a large extent by professional NGOs. Smaller charitable organizations (paralleling somehow the Israeli trend) seem to be expanding, but they are not working directly on conflict transformation, but rather on organizing self-help at the local level and empowering people, albeit with a different ideological equipment than professional NGOs.
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For professional NGOs, the assessments of de-politicization (Hammami 1995) , NGO-ization It can also be less pro-active since it resides anyway close to power and benefits therefore from direct access to the national media in the oPt.
In terms of effectiveness in reaching out the international community, one can only say that the glass can be seen as half-empty or half-full. Many CSOs have developed their own networks of international correspondents and have professionalized the diffusion of news feed. Whether these actually influence international public opinion is probably a matter of subjective opinion. One can also wonder whether this type of information is not simply a form of preaching to the converted since people rarely "change allegiance" in their source of information (but what matters, eventually, is to fill the space of media coverage). The fact that there is still a small portion of aid given to solidarity and political organizations hints nonetheless at the effectiveness of certain CSOs to mobilize private resources and support abroad, although these organizations tend not to be the ones funded by the EU, which prefers, instead, politically neutral organizations. 
Back to the EU and conflict transformation through civil society
EU Impact
Since at least the 1980 Venice Declaration, peace between Israel and Palestine has been a cardinal objective of the EC/EU. But is lack of internal cohesion and its inherent difficulty in turning an overall objective into an effective common foreign policy is a well-known problem of the EU. The 50 With all the consequences that it had during the Oslo years for CSOs close to Palestinian parties who opposed the peace process. Thus NGOs close to the PFLP and DFLP lost a lot of money in the first years of the Oslo years, demonstrating that donors were keener on buttressing the peace process even if came at the expenses of sound development.
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a perfect example of this and the fact that the US was the main One or two success stories of civil society suggestions feeding official EU policy seem however to exist. 52 But the overpowering reputation of the EU remains that of a heavily bureaucratic institution.
The difficulties in understanding the jargons of different calls for proposals as well as the neverending reporting duties for CSOs which benefit from EU funding is a also a serious problem and hampers the chances of EU projects to make a significant impact on the ground. The EU is an important actor for Palestinian CSOs in particular (this explains also why many CSOs commission reports on the perception of the EU inside the oPt) but many remain disillusioned by the gap between EU rhetoric and its acts and facts on the ground.
The Commission Delegations are certainly aware of such criticism. They also acknowledge that more aid could be given to civil society and that there was a need to 'go back to the drawing board specifically to the massive rents that aid represent, it is difficult to imagine a way out of the current standoff between Hamas and Fatah. The EU should therefore explore more systematically the possibility to function as real political broker since it is already the most powerful actor in terms of funds pledged and disbursed to the oPt. Similarly, it should also use its close vicinity, both geographically and economically, with Israel to put pressure on the Israeli government to accept a negotiated solution leading to the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The pending decision on the upgrading of the formal ties between the EU and Israel is a golden opportunity that the EU has to exploit wisely. further to a broader trend towards a managerial approach of aid for civil society, which is detrimental to the variety, dynamism and rootedness of local civil societies (Challand 2008b) .
Explaining EU activities in the civil society domain
The second problem is that the EU is rather inconsistent, or put more mildly, the Union does not show a clear policy or preferred strategy in terms of conflict transformation. Over the last five years, the EU's pendulum of civil society support swings between the rather conservative approaches of the Oslo years (e.g. the people-the-people programmes) to cutting-edge projects (adopting innovative approaches dealing with the cognitive dimension of the conflict (e.g. Mosawa,
whoprofits.org). However, it is clear that the EU has some preferred partners and approaches, as evidenced by the resurgence of people-to-people activities and the recent resurrection of the Geneva Initiative, which partly owe to the Union's financial support. Overall, the EU funds also innovative projects but not in a very consistent manner. There are also off-the record complaints that the EU has censored certain institutions which used to receive EU funding through the Tel Aviv office because of the fact that these programmes were too critical of Israel. Reversely, the EU seems to use local CSOs to air criticism against Israel, all of which hints further to the lack of a clear line that the EU would be ready to defend in the face of a backlash of the Israeli government.
The third problem relates to the three hypotheses discussed in the orientation paper (Tocci 2008) .
Overall, the interviewed people were mostly in favour of the Gramscian critique, though some observers also thought that there was ground to argue for both the liberal and the disembedded civil society hypotheses. The problem with all three hypotheses is that the EU is only sending top-down inputs and four CSOs interviewed lamented the fact that there was not a bottom-up arrow linking mid-range organizations and the EU. The point is not just a graphic one, but a substantial one in the sense that CSO actors perceive that there is a true dialogue only between the EU and state-level actors. Therefore, the EU reinforces the impression that state elites (both in Israel and Palestine) distrust mid and grassroots organizations, not to mention the fact that Palestinian Diaspora groups are conspicuously absent in EU funded civil society activities. Others commented on the fact that grassroots organizations are nicely represented as the basis of the pyramid, but in terms of funding, the number of organizations and their actual rootedness is rather low. A more realistic depiction of civil society in the region would rather have Lederach's pyramid standing on its tip. This also hints at a serious lack of rootedness of local CSOs with the local population. To the extent to which this has also been the product of EU funding, then the disembedded civil society hypothesis may best depict the situation on the ground.
Certain observers wonder whether the EU has not been co-opted into Israeli strategies of chaos management, namely the idea that violence between the two sides are largely instrumentalized and guided so as to create the "good" conditions for Israel to dictate the course and terms of (non-) negotiations, and/or pushing for its own networks of "peace NGOs" with little rooting in their respective society (a view which would reinforce the realist critique). The fact that the EU has been following US policies of non-engagement with Hamas seems also to paralyze Palestinian CSOs in their effort to engage with such a central actor in Palestinian politics because the EU could retaliate by cutting funding to CSOs willing to speak with Hamas. Instead, it is safer for the EU to engage into the "sexiness" and the visual graphics of "people-to-people" projects which fail however to alter the conflict dynamics.
We will conclude this report on the complex interplay between the EU and civil society 
